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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
As major reports on energy show, the power sector in Africa faces multiple issues. 
First,insufficient capacities, with anelectrificationratethat keeps declining with The 68 
gigawatts (GW) entire generation capacity of the 48 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa is no 
more than that of Spain1. According to the World Bank, 28% only of Africans have access to 
electricity versus 40% in other low income regions. Secondly consumers suffer, high cost and 
unreliability with 56 power outageson averages in a year. Lastly, the average electricity tariff 
of US$0.13 per kilowatt is far above the US$0.04 to US$0.08 observed in the developing 
world.2
In West Africa, it is forecasted that electricity demand will grow at over 7% annually 
considering the existing grid capacity of 10,000 MW and planned retirements, in order to 
meet the soaring demand, it is imperative that the region increases its generating capacity at 
least to 27,000 MW by 2023. Majority of thecountries in West Africa produce small 
quantities of supply only and except for Ghana and Nigeria who can generate capacity of 
more than 1,000 MW. Countries in the region rely on (expensive) importation of heavy fuel 
oil or gas oil, or electricity.Unprecedented series of interruption in supply blamed on drought 
 
1Anton Eberhardet al, “Underpowered: The State of the Power Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa 
“,World Bank, June 2008) 
2The World Bank. Fact sheet: the World Bank and energy in Africa. 2013 
http://go.worldbank.org/8VI6E7MRU0 
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are common. This led to economic recession in Ghana, Benin and Togo3. Insufficient 
generation also caused multiple outages in Nigeria (drought and draining of Kainji), Mali, 
Niger, and Senegal. The absence of diversification of power sources with hydropower 
representing the essential source of energy in most cases. The WAPP hasn’t been able to 
attract much investment in the region a task that is difficult considering its harmonized vision 
for the entire region.4
The Different reforms implemented on the quest for potential remedy,and supposedly 
considered as ultimate solutions, yielded no satisfactory results. Although privatization 
helped improve management system and operation cost for instance, it hasn’t really been able 
to provide more investment to develop the sector. The reluctance to input more funds in such 
capital intensive sector is mostly blamed on poor regulatory aspect and the deterioration of 
infrastructure5.  Moreover, insufficient sources of financediscouragesinvestment;considering 
difficulties to access the international financial market and the weaknessof domestic markets. 
Despite difficulties in the financial aspect, due to incomplete 
reformscreatemultipleshortcomingsfor the regulatory factor. For instance, 
TheIndependenceofregulatory agencies is far from being a reality. The regulatory agencies 
often times constitute an obstacle to investment themselves.6Governance is also citedas a 
determinant factor in the cancellation of projects as shown by researchers on the 
 
3EdgardGnansounou, “Boosting the Electricity Sector in West Africa: An Integrative Vision”, 
IAEE, p23.
4EdgardGnansounou, “Boosting the Electricity Sector in West Africa: An Integrative Vision”, 
IAEE, p23. 
5 ibid 
6DambudzoMuzenda,"Increasing private investment in African energy infrastructure”, 
NEPAD-OECD Africa Investment Initiative,November 2009.
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reasonprivate sector exit in infrastructure sector.7Weak institutions, poor legal system, lack of 
enforcement, lack of skills and of political will are some of the many obstacles to the success 
of reforms in the power sector. In some countries due to the complexity of the legal aspect of 
energy projects there is a lack of lawyers with experience in the sector. Certain Government 
departments do notpay their bills and moreover the general public isn’t educated on energy 
conservation8. Different conflicts in certain countries of both West and central Africa are 
equally impediments to the ability to attract more investment and the performance of already 
established utility companies. Destruction of infrastructure has occurred during the civil war 
in the republic of Congo, demanding huge investment for reconstruction once the war was 
over. 
For specialists of the review “Constructif”, the main obstacles to electrification in SSA 
countries are not technical but rather organizational because the technical solutions are now 
relatively well understood.9  This clearly suggests that it is more of a problem of governance 
and management rather than technical that hinders the achievement of energy sufficiency 
across the continent.Thus paper seeks to investigate the existence of a possible correlation or 
a causal relationship between the quality of governance and the difficulties inherent to power 
supply in SSA. More specially, the paper will seek to establish first whether or not countries 
that achieved improvementsinthe control of corruption, political stability better address the 
 
7Clive Harris and Kumar V. Pratap, “What drives private sector exit from 
infrastructure?”,Gridlines,March 2009. 
8 DambudzoMuzenda,"Increasing private investment in African energy infrastructure”, 
NEPAD-OECD Africa Investment Initiative, November 2009.
9Anjal et al, Les enjeux de l’électrificationdans les pays en développement. Constructif. N°9 
November, 2004.(translated from French by author). 
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imbalance between supply and demand of power supply and secondly the contribution of 
privatization to the resolution of energy poverty. Finally, the paper will endeavor to come up 
with policy recommendations on how to evaluate and improve the performance of regulatory 
organs responsible for the well-functioning of the sector. 
1.2 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The generic purpose of this research is to investigate possible relationship between 
governance in west and central Africa and the state of energy supply using credible empirical 
evidences. To this end, the paper will look at the behavior of countries following their 
national institutional endowments in relationship totherate of electrification over the years. . 
This being said, is there a possible correlation or a causal relationship between the quality of 
governance and the difficulties inherent to power supply in SSA? Could improvements the 
control of corruption, political stability or governance yield better assessment of the 
imbalance between supply and demand of power supply? To what extend have privatization 
been an efficient mean to address the issue of energy poverty? One major goal of power 
regulatory agencies is their ability to attract investment in the power sector. Is the ability to 
attract investor characterized by the standard of economy-wide governance and political 
freedom? 
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
More than a decade have passed since the first power reform in west and central Africa 
and the situation seems to have remained quite the same. In this study we evaluate the present 
state of power sector a decade later. Previous studies were made in the early years 2000 like 
such by Pierre-olivierPineau on Cameroon post privatization power sector but a more updated 
8
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analysis will give a clearer insight of the situation prevailing and pave the way for further 
studies.10
2Background 
The current state of Sub-Saharan Africa’spower generation capacity is in an appalling 
level thus earning it the pejorative qualification of “dark continent.”Indeed, notwithstanding 
that SSA is home to12%of the world's hydro potential including those from 
otherrenewableenergy sources such assolar or wind.Therecent economic growths recorded by 
many of the region’s countries,whilst encouraging risk being held back by the power 
generation deficit. .  
The reality is that, the Congo River despite having the biggest hydroelectric potential in 
the continent, only 6% of Congolese have access to electricity.11Only 3% of Cameroon’s 
23,000 MW of exploitable hydropower resources is developed.12. To top it all off, the 
situation is expected to get worse as the demand for energy keeps increasing. The link 
betweenlowpower generation and poverty is undeniable as it dramatically disadvantages 
millions of people and hinders the economy. 
The above state of things is translated into an inability to connect schools, businesses, 
 
10 Pierre-olivierPineau, “Transparency in the Dark – An Assessment of the Cameroonian 
Electricity Sector Reform”,August 12, 2004 
11BenediktFranke.“Africathe“dark”continentbetweenhopeandfrustration.”WorldSecurityNetwork.August24,
2009.http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Africa/FrankeBenedikt/Africathedarkcontinentbetweenhope
andfrustration
12Seline van der Wat. “Hydro in Africa: Navigating a Continent of Untapped Potential.” Hydro Review
Worldwide.October2013
http://www.hydroworld.com/articles/print/volume21/issue6/articles/africanhydropower/hydroinafricanav
igatingacontinent.html
9

households and businesses to the grid by undermining productivity on multiple levels. . 
Farmers are deprived of the opportunity that new technology could bring to their yields; 
hospitals become constrained provide modern healthcare and so goes the list of 
inconveniencies. It is clearly established that an absence of adequate power supply impacts 
poverty indicators such as infant mortality, illiteracy and life expectancy. Recent Studies are 
aiming at determining the impact of energy poverty on education. Macroeconomic indicators 
show that the average cost of power outfalls for African economies is around 2, 1% of GDP 
as reported by the World Bank factsheet13.It is in response to the need to provide adequate 
solutions to the afore mentioned problems that this thesis is aimed at addressing. 
4.1. GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION AND FEATURES 
4.1.1. West Africa 
The West African region is the part of the African continent which southern and western 
borders are constituted by the Atlantic Ocean whereas the northern border is the Sahara 
Desert. The Ranishanu is considered to be its northernmost part. The eastern border is either 
at the Benue Through or a line going from the Mount Cameroon to the Lake Chad. The 
region is constituted of 16 countries that include:  
- Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Nigerwhich are mostly in the Sahel, a transition 
 
13TheWorldBank.Factsheet:theWorldBankandenergyinAfrica.2013
http://go.worldbank.org/8VI6E7MRU0
http://www.reegle.info/policyandregulatoryoverviews/MR
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zone between the Sahara desert and the Sudanian Savanna. 
- Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Togo, and Nigeriaall located in the Gulf of Guinea. 
- Cape Verde is an island country in the Atlantic Ocean. 
- Mauritania although having joined the Maghreb countries has traditionally been 
located in West Africa as well. 
These countries except for Mauritaniathat withdrew in 1999, form the Economic Community 
of West African States a regional trade and economic union also known as ECOWAS.14The
region’s geography is constituted of plains less than 300 meters above sea level with isolated 
high points in the southern part. The northern part is dominated by the so-called Sahel; 
semi-arid lands in between the Sahara and the savanna. The southern coastalpartis a zone 
spread out between the savanna and a rain forest.15According to the 2013 world population 
data sheet the western African region has a population of 330, 7 million people with a natural 
increase of 2.7%.16
4.1.2. Central Africa  
Central Africa or rather middle Africa as categorized by the United Nations, is the region in 
Africa constituted by countries like Angola, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, 
 
14The Economic Community of West AfricanStates,“ECOWASmember States”, December 04, 
2013.
http://www.ecowas.int/ 
15Wikipedia contributors, "west Africa," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, accessed June 14, 
2014.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/West_Africa 
16Population Reference Bureau,“world population data sheet”,accessed June 14, 2014. 
http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2013/2013-world-population-data-sheet/world-m
ap.aspx#map/world/population/2013 
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the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
São Tomé and Príncipe, Burundi and Rwanda.Eleven of the above mentioned countries form 
a trade and economic union called the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS)with the exclusion of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Rwanda and 
Burundi. The region is home to the great rain forest basin of the Congo River. Central Africa 
is dominated by the equatorial forest mostly except in the north for Chad and some parts of 
Cameroon and the Central African Republic which is the dwelling of the Sahel region.17 The 
middle African region has a population of 138 millioninhabitants and a natural increase of 
3.0%.18
4.2. OVERVIEW OF THE POWER SECTOR IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA 
According to the UPDEA (Union of Producer, Transporters and Distributors of Electricity 
inAfrica) data of 2006: 
- The total installed capacity in Africa was about 106.3 GW from which SSA૟
Accountsfor66.8 GW (63%); 
- The total annual electricity consumption for Africa was estimated at about 488,315 
GWh from which SSA accounts 325,950 GWh (66.7%); 
- Total consumption of electricity per habitant per annum for Africa 532 
KWh/habitant/year; 
 
17Wikipedia contributors, "Central Africa," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, accessed June 
14, 2014. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Africa 
18 Ibid. 
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 West Africa 155 kWh/habitant/year 
 Central Africa 151 kWh/habitant/year 
Access to electricity is very low in SSA in general, if South Africa is excluded the access rate 
is reduced to 3 to 40% only.19The rate of electrification in Africaby region was the following 
in recent years. 
ELECTRIFICATION RATES IN AFRICA 
Source: (1) Pool Energétique de l’Afrique Centrale (PEAC). 1 May 2011, COMELEC, 2009, 
SAPP 2010 Statistics, EAPP2011. WAPP September 2010 
The existing power generating capacity in West Africa (MW) is as follow: 
 2010 2009 Var. 
2010/2009 %
GWh % GWh %  
Total energy 
generated
46 049 100% 39993 100% 15% 
 
19Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, “Power Supply Situation in Africa”, ICA annual 
meeting, March 14 
2008.http://www.icafrica.org/fileadmin/documents/Tokyo/Background_paper_Power_Supply
_situation_in_Africa_FINAL.pdf
North Africa 39 to 99% 
West Africa 4 to 40%
Central Africa 4 to 37%
East Africa 2.3%to 44% % 
Southern 9%  to 75% 
13
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Hydro 17090 37% 17992 45% 5% 
Thermal 28959 63% 22000 55% 31.6% 
Energy imported 3655 7.9% 2236 5.6% 63.5% 
Energy exported 2844 6.2% 2871 7.2% -1% 
Gross
Consumption 
46435  39357  18% 
Source: WAPP: Systèmed’Echangesd’EnergieElectriqueOuestAfricain, Aperçu des 
Projets/WAPP, Projectsat a Glance, May 2011. 
Hydropower generation is mainly concentrated in two countries Nigeria and Ghanaare with 
respectively, 43.4% and 40.9% of the total production.It is however important to notice that 
the hydropower generation in the region have been decreasing in recent years.20The
consumption of electricity was recorded as follow: 
WAPP-2010 Electricity Consumption per Country (GWh)  
 
20InfrastructureConsortiumforAfrica,“PowerSupplySituationinAfrica”,ICAannualmeeting,March142008.
http://www.icafrica.org/fileadmin/documents/Tokyo/Background_paper_Power_Supply_situation_in_Africa_F
INAL.pdf
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Sources: WAPP: Systèmed’Echangesd’EnergieElectriqueOuestAfricain, Aperçu des 
Projets/WAPP, Projectsat a Glance, May 2011. Also Statistiques de l’Electricité du 
COMELEC, 2009 
Electricity Access per Country (%) was as follow: 
Benin Burkina 
Faso
Côte
d’Ivoire
Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea 
Bissau 
23 10 30 25 25 13 3 
Liberia Mali Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra 
Leone
Mauritania Togo 
5 10 3 40 30 8 19 13 
Source: WAPP Generation and Transmission Assets (WGTA) First Issue, September 
2010
Nigeria
Ghana
Coted'Ivoire
Mali
Senegal
Niger
BurkinaFaso
Benin/Togo
Liberia
SierraLeone
Guinea
GuineaBissau
Mauritania
Gambia
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
Consumption(GWH)
Consumption(GWH)
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In central Africa the scenario is somewhat similar. The annual consumption per capita 
is about 109kwh although the region is endowed with great hydroelectric potential. The 
Hydroelectric potential of the region as a whole is of about 144,200MW, with the most the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Cameroon having 100,000MW and 23,000MW 
respectively. The energy outcome could skyrocket to a level of about 1,083,000KWh but yet, 
the total installed capacity is roughly 2294.502MW. The available power sources in the 
region are from hydroelectric, coal, gas and oil leaving too little space for renewable energy 
sources such as solar or wind.Recent data of power generation and consumption exhibit the 
following results. 
CAPP-2009 Power Generation and Consumption by Country (GWh) 
 powergeneration(gwh) electricityconsumption(GWH)
Cameroon 4256 4085
Chad 182 155
0 2000 4000 6000 8000
Cameroon
Chad
CAR
Congo
DRC
Rwanda
Burundi
SaoTome
EquatorialGuinea
Gabon
Angola
electricityconsumption(GWH)
powergeneration(gwh)
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CAR 126 71
Congo 898 433
DRC 7383 4890
Burundi 207 207
SaoTome 27 22
Equatorial
Guinea
524 220
Gabon 1638 1436
Angola 4153 3719
Source: (1) Pool Energétique de l’AfriqueCentrale (PEAC.). Présentationgénérale du 
secteurélectrique en AfriqueCentrale, Europe Aid/126679/C/SER/CG; WYG International, 01 
May 2011. 
Despite being endowed with a huge hydraulic potential of about 144 000 KWh 
essentially concentrated in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Cameroon, the 
electrification rate in the regionhasremainedworryinglylow (13%). 21
 
21KAPANDJIKALALABruno,“CURRENTSTATUSOFCAPPPROJECTS”,CentralAfricanPowerPool,May222009.

http://www.esiafrica.com/wpcontent/uploads/KAPANDJI%20KALALA%20Bruno.pdf
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Countries 
accessto
Electricity%
Angola 37.80%
DRC 9%
Cameroon 53.70%
Equatorial
Guinea 15%
Rwanda 7%
Burundi 1.80%
Gabon 60%
Chad 2%
SaoTome 60%
Congo 37.80%
accesstoElectricity%
Angola
DRC
Cameroon
EquatorialGuinea
Rwanda
Burundi
Gabon
Chad
SaoTome
Congo
CAR
18
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CAR 4%
Source: Pool Energétique de l’AfriqueCentrale (PEAC). Présentationgénérale du 
secteurélectrique en AfriqueCentrale, Europe Aid/126679/C/SER/CG; WYG International, 1 
May 2011. 
2 ENERGY REFORM IN CENTRAL AND WEST AFRICA 
Reform as it is widely known is defined in terms of deregulation or minimizing government 
involvement in the sector. This interpretation as it is, although present in most literature and 
recognized by multilateral aid agencies can benefit more widened definition. Deregulation 
takes place for several reasons such as: 
- Poor financial and technical performance 
- Lack of funds to expand and develop the sector  
- Developing a competitive sector and by ricochet will bring along better quality and 
low price. 
- Remove subsidies, adjust tariffs in relation to cost 
- Reduce state monopoly  and provide a level playing field 
- Provide legal ground for power sector stakeholders. 
- Other macroeconomic constraints external to the power sector such as fiscal 
constraints or international investment climate can motivate the implementation of 
deregulation.
Commonly reforms take either the form of either a change in the nature of ownership or 
restructuring the company. A combination of both options is not excluded. 
19
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In the privatization option several steps and legal tools are used to make the reform effective. 
The most common pattern is the transformation of a wholly state owned utility company into 
a parastatalenterprise.The plan to give away the state-owned company can eventually lead to 
a total corporatization or commercialization. Privatization can also take the form of contract 
management where the administration of the utility company is entrusted to a private 
company. Related privatization actions like the amendment of an electricity act are to be 
considered. The objectives of amending an electricity law is to first remove the monopoly 
then provide legal grounds for the regulatory agencies and other stakeholders. The role of 
overseer is passed to an independent regulatory organ established in the place of the ministry 
department in the situation of a state-owned monopoly. Further privatization initiative will be 
the introduction of Independent private producers in the generation stage of energy 
production to a complete privatization of generation, transmission and distribution.22
Restructuration or unbundling can take two aspects either vertical or horizontal unbundling. 
The objectives are to achieve a more efficient management of the company and to gain 
establish a competitive environment. Vertical unbundling designates the separation of a 
vertically integrated company in separate entities independently engaged in generation, 
transmission or distribution. Horizontal unbundle consist mostly in regionalizing the utility 
company. Separate new entitiesare created in charge of generation, transmission or 
distribution at a regional level. That is common in countries with vast territory such as the 
 
22K. Syngellakis et al. , “Training Manuel on Sustainable Energy Regulation and 
Policymaking for Africa”, United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Module 4, 
accessed June 14, 2014. 
http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/import/83245_Module4.pdf 
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United States or Nigeria in our case.23
2.1.1 POWER REFORM IN WEST AFRICA 
The region has organized itself into a pool intending to achieve integration of power system 
and development of a regional market. The West African Power Pool or WAPP, the institution 
representing the pool has helped in its effort improve electrification particularly in countries 
lessfavored with energy sources. The following countries belong to the pool: Benin, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, SierraLeoneand Togo. 
In the late 1990’s following the structural changes and in legislative modification in the 
power sector independent power projects grew rapidly. By 1996 to1998, this trend slowed 
down to reaccelerate in 2000-2001. Nevertheless the introduction of IPP’S in the region 
favored mostly large scale projects with not much local private participation as opposed to 
medium or small scale projects. 
Power sector Reforms in West Africa 
Countries 
Reform
policy 
corporatization 
Indepen
dent
Regulati
on
agency
Electricity 
act
unbundling
Managemen
t contract 
 
23 K. Syngellakis et al. , “Training Manuel on Sustainable Energy Regulation and 
Policymaking for Africa”,United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 
Introduction,accessed June 14, 2014. 
http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Publications/Pub_free/training_manual_on_susta
inable_energy_regulation_and_policymaking_for_Africa.pdf 
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Burkina 
Faso
In place no no In place none In place 
Cote
d’Ivoire 
In place In place In place In place None none 
Benin In place none none In place none none
Ghana In place In place In place In place In place none 
Niger In place In place In place In place In place Pending
Nigeria In place In place In place In place none In place 
Guinea In place In place none In place none none
Guinea
Bissau
In place none none In place none In place 
Liberia In place In place none In place none In place 
Mali In place In place In place In place none In place 
Mauritania In place none In place In place none In place 
Senegal In place In place In place In place none In place 
Sierra Leone In place In place In place In place none In place 
Cape Verde In place In place In place In place none In place 
Gambia In place none In place In place none In place 
Togo In place none none none In place None 
Source: World Bank and PPIAF, PPI Project Database. (http://ppi.worldbank.org), UPDEA, 
2006
Presence of independent producers and distributors (IPPs above 40MW as of 2013) 
22
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countries IPP’S 
Burkina Faso none 
Cote d’Ivoire In place 
Benin none 
Ghana In place 
Niger none 
Nigeria In place 
Guinea none 
Guinea Bissau None 
Liberia none 
Mali none 
Mauritania None 
Senegal In place 
Sierra Leone none 
Cape Verde none 
Gambia None 
Togo In place 
Source: Gratwick, K.N., Eberhard, A., 2011. 
Major IPP projects in West Africa agreed as of August 2000 
countries Capacity/place Year project signed Companies 
Cote d’Ivoire 210MW  at Vridi 
210 MW (Scheme VII)
1990
1994
CIPREL (SAUR/EdF 
joint venture) 
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288 MW at Azito (BO
Project)
1998 SAUR/EdF 
EdF/ABB
Ghana 110 MW at Takor
Power Station 
110 MW Takoradi II 
220 MW near Tema 
80 MW Tema 
1997
1999
1998
1999
CMS-VRA
CMS-VRA
KMR Power, EPDL 
and Marubeni 
Union Fenosa 
Nigeria  548MW (build 
operate)
276MW Southern 
Nigeria
1999
2000
Enron
Siemens 
Senegal 60MW 
37MW 
1999
1998
General Electric 
HQI
Sources: PSIRU database; Karekezi and Mutiso, 1999,i Energy Information Administration 
(www.eia.doe.gov), 
The objective of a regional strategy was aiming at reinforcing the various reforms undertaken 
by most of the countries.24Major projects in West Africa include: 
- OMVG – 2,000 kilometers of 225 kV transmission lines and associated hydropower 
Projects; the 240 MW Kaléta hydro plant will be the first, 
 
24EdgardGnansounou, “Boosting the Electricity Sector in West Africa: An Integrative 
Vision”, IAEE, p23.
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- OMVS – hydropower projects at Félou (62 MW) and Gouina, and expansion of the 
existing 225 kV transmission system in Senegal. 
The WAPP Master Plan project to 2011 was as follow: 
 Projects demand MW *Additional Demand 
2011 1 2,570 6 ,093 
2015 1 6,638 1 0,161 
2020 2 2,467 1 5,990 
*Projection based on 2003 Demand 
Source: WAPP, 2007 
2.1.2 POWER REFORM IN CENTRAL AFRICA 
Countries Reform 
policy 
corporatization Regulation
agency
Electricity
act
unbundling Management 
contract
Cameroon In place In place In place In place none In place 
Chad place none none none none In place 
Congo In place none none none none none
DRC In place In place none none None none 
CAR In place none In place none none none
Equatorial
Guinea 
In place In place none none none none 
25
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Sao tome 
&
Principe
In place In place In place In place none none
Angola In place In place In place In place none In place 
Rwanda In place none In place In place none none
Burundi none none none in place none none 
Source: World Bank (2011): Project Information Document (Pid) Concept Stage, Source: 
UPDEA, 2006 
Presence of independent producer or distributor in the region(IPPs above 40MW) 
Countries IPPS 
Cameroon In place  
Chad none 
Congo none 
DRC None 
CAR none 
Equatorial
Guinea
none
Sao tome 
& Principe 
none
Angola none 
Rwanda In place 
26
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Burundi none 
Source: Gratwick, K.N., Eberhard, A., 2011. 
Central African countries except for Rwanda analogically to the western ECOWAS, are 
gathered in a Central Africa Power Pool or CAPP. Major projects in the CAPP Region 
include:
1. Study on the development of the Inga sites hydropower development and 
theassociated interconnections. 
2. Rehabilitation of Inga-1 and 2 and associated transmission lines plus multinational 
330 kV Solwezi-Kolwezi line. 
3. Study on the Interconnections of CAPP Member States electricity grid25
Summary of the status of reforms in various countries  
&RPSHWLWLYH
JHQHUDWLRQ
DQG
GLVWULEXWLRQ
)XOO\
XQEXQGOHG
XWLOLW\
0XOWLSOH
JHQHUDWLRQ
ZLWKVLQJOH
1LJHU
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&DPHURRQ
&oteGಬ,YRLUH*KDQD
 
25Power Supply situation in Africa 
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As it can be seen none of the countries in both of the regions has fully restructured the power 
sector nor fully privatized it. This suggests that carrying out privatization of distribution 
seems more difficult than generation. By observing the performance of privatized companies 
in other regions such as in Mauritius, South Africa and Zimbabwe it seems that privatization 
might not be the ultimate solution. 
1.4.3 GOVERNANCE IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA 
Stability in West Africa is highly at stake due mostly to the vulnerability in the Gulf of 
Guinea, the threat of terrorism in the Sahel-Sahara and internal conflicts. In the Gulf of 
Guinea, the state of security is quite precarious. There is lack of facilities and adequate 
materialsto ensure sustainable security. Nigeria’s navy, the largest and the best equipped in 
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the region consists of sixteen warships and a maritime reconnaissance capability of four 
helicopters26 only. This lax situationbenefitsmostlypirates and other criminals who have 
more or less free rein to run all sort of criminal activities. In the Sahel the presence of Al 
Qaida and other armed militant groupslikein Mali, Niger and Nigeria has brought along an 
outbreak of violent acts, kidnapping and therefore weakened the state of the security in the 
sub-region.
The year 1990’s and early 2000 were also marked with a succession of internal conflicts 
in Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra Leoneand Liberia, which affected the economic development in those 
countries. Empirical data have shown great correlation between bad governance and 
instability. Before the end of the Cold War, most West African countries were subject to civil 
military diarchy maintained by clan allegiance, patronage, and repressive securityrackets27.
Other systems were the ones violence peace established in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea 
Bissau characterizedbyrampant corruption and absence of infrastructure development. 
Attempts to challenge such bad governance ended up in instability in Benin and Mali, and 
later, civil wars in Guinea-Bissau, and Cote d’Ivoire.  
Nevertheless, in the 1990’s the democratization process started taking place and 
presently all presidents in the region are either democratically elected or confirmed to their 
positions through ballots. This trend here is by no means without controversies as many 
challenges still lie ahead. Politically, with the exception of Ghana, Cape Verde, Senegal and 
Benin democracy is much more in retreat. Some of the regimes are clearly democracies but in 
 
26Mark J.Sorbara,“The United States and Maritime Security in the Gulf ofGuinea,”Petroleum 
Africa, July 2007, p.56. 
27Abdel-FatauMusah,“West Africa: governance and security in a changing region “,
International Peace Institute, 2009, p.4. 
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name only as they behave more like constitutional monarchies,autocracies, and virtual 
one-party states than to rising democracies.
This is said to affect economic performance since good resource governance depends 
greatly on sound political governance. It is moreover necessary to notify the inability of 
democracy to translate growth in development with the advent of “popular” mandates.28
Ranks and Score of West Africa Countries – Corruption Perceptions Index (2013) 
World
Rank  
West Africa  
Rank  
Country 
1
30
41
63
77
83
94
106
119
119
1
1
1
1
2
2
3
4
5
Finland
59
Botswana 
60CapeVerde
Ghana
Senegal  
Burkina Faso  
Benin 
Niger
Sierra Leone  
Mauritania
 
28  Abdel-FatauMusah,“West Africa: governance and security in a changing region “, 
International Peace Institute, 2009, p.4. 
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123
127
127
136
144
150
5
6
7
7
8
8
9
Togo
Mali
Gambia
CôteD’Ivoire 
Nigeria  
Guinea 
Source: Transparency International CPI – 2013 
     In central Africa, less effort towards democratization can be observed, although some 
elements of stability are noticeable in Cameroon, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Terrorist 
threat in Cameroon and recent conflicts in Central African Republic and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo suggest that the stability in the region isn’t yet achieved. The 
“democracies”of the sub- region similar to the West African counterpart are quite 
questionable. Governance in central Africa has proved to be mostly dominated by autocracies 
with a lack of transparency, weak and highly corrupt institutions. 
Ranks and Score of Central Africa Countries – Corruption Perceptions Index (2013) 
World
Rank  
Central Africa  
Rank  
Countries 
49 1 Rwanda
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72 2 Sao tome & Principe 
106 2 Gabon
144 3 Cameroon 
144 3 Central Africa Republic 
153 4 Angola 
154 4 DRC 
154 4 Congo
157 5 Burundi
163 6 Chad
163 7 EquatorialGuinea
Source:TransparencyInternationalCPI–2013
Despite encouraging changes for individual countries in the SSA region, the average CPI 
score stays unchanged at 33 and the CPI has gone down slightlyfor the25 topcountries in term 
of GDP this year. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical Background  
In a laudable discussion paper on private sector electricity in developing countries, 
Jack D. Glen argues that privatization and regulatory reforms as opposed to state monopoly is 
of highest efficiency to address the issue of imbalance of supply and demand of utility in 
developing countries.Glen however, argues that although growth increases demand for 
electricity, it is the lack of investment in energy efficient technologies that causes production 
output to remain low in relation to the amount of energy engaged. Deregulation and 
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privatization of the sector in the developing world will possibly bring a favorable change in 
the sector and help address the imbalance between supply and demand. In this argument 
against the traditional monopoly in utilities business, Glen shows limits such as the inability 
to raise funds to finance energy efficient sector and the inefficient operation in state owned 
utilities companies. It is therefore necessary according to Glen, to createa suitable 
environment for Independent energy Producers (IPP’s) to engage in generation, transmission 
and distribution of power.29
This widespread concept of reform founded on deregulation shows not very 
encouraging results, often times because the reforms are incomplete or rather because of 
malfunctions peculiar to the institutions responsible of carrying out the reform. Such 
connection has been previously studied by pioneers of the question such as Levy and Spiller. 
In their work published in 1994, the authors already noticed that it would be naive to think 
that privatization and regulatory reform could lead to an improvement in the quality of 
service or help bring down prices with the social and political circumstances not taking in 
account. The main argument for the study was that: “the credibility and effectiveness of a 
regulatory framework-and hence its ability to facilitate private investment-varies with a 
country's political and social institutions”.30The problem as detected by the authorsremains 
the need for large scale economy of scale and scope, highly specific assets, and the clientele 
mainly constituted with households and therefore the voting population. For Levy & spiller,it 
 


30Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller, “The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: 
A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation ”Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Oct., 1994), pp. 201-246
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is imperative to examinethe institutional endowments of the countries since they have a 
strong influence on the regulatory design. The design as defined by Levis & spiller is 
composed of regulatory governance and regulatory incentives. Regulatory governance 
designates the apparatus that a society uses to limit regulatory discretion and deal with 
inherent conflicts. Regulatory incentive however, designates the rules related to pricing, entry, 
subsidies and other interconnection.31 Both tools are constrained by the institutional 
endowment of a country which is the country's legislative and executive institution,judicial 
institutions, customs and accepted norms, the administrative capabilities of country and 
finally ideologies and other antagonism insocial interests. The different institution should 
able to restraint administrative discretion when making regulatory decision giving less room 
to the arbitrary. 
Their analysis of the telecommunication sector in UK, Jamaica, Philippines, Argentina 
and Chile, following a model of a country's institutional endowments establish the 
relationship between the political institution and the effectiveness of performance of 
regulatory organs. 
Further study by Stern & Holder in 1999 focuses on the regulatory process and more informal 
accountability resulting from informal institutionalized customs and accepted norms as well 
as ideologies and other antagonism in social interests which were not examined by Levy & 
Stern. For Stern and Holder formal institutionalized mechanism consist of the legal aspect 
surrounding the regulatory activity while informal institutionalized mechanism designate the 
 
31 ibid
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process through which regulatory activity takes place. Meaning for instance how the different 
stakeholders interpret the existing legislation.32The formal accountability aspects include:  
• Clarity of Roles and Objectives  
• Autonomy  
• Accountability  
The informal accountability aspects studied are:  
• Participation  
• Transparency; and  
• Predictability. 33
Stern and Holder use a framework made of best practices by OECD countries to evaluate the 
infrastructure industry of Asian countries such as Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Pakistan and Philippines.Some key definitions are given in the following table: 
Box 1: Criteria for Regulatory Governance and Best Practice Definitions 
 
32 JonStern,“Evaluating infrastructure regulators: developing UK and international 
practice.”,CPEA 2006, September 
33Stern and Holder, 1999, p.42
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1. Clarity of Roles and Objectives: The regulatory function is well articulated, well enshrined in 
primary legislation, and clearly separated in practice from policy and commercial functions.  
2. Autonomy: There is a separate regulator with arrangements for appointment and financing which 
appear to guarantee autonomy of action.  
3. Participation: A comprehensive process of formal consultation (including public hearings and 
publication of and comment on consultation responses) is followed before decisions are made.  
4. Accountability: There is full accountability in terms of appeals, including a specific legal right of 
redress. The accountability of the regulator to Courts or parliament for fulfilling general legal duties is 
appropriate without being excessive.  
5. Transparency: All regulatory documents are available to the public, except where specifically 
classified as confidential and the regulator publishes major decisions as well as the reasoning behind 
major decisions.  
6. Predictability: Regulatory powers and duties cannot be changed without changes in primary law; key 
regulatory instruments or documents cannot be changed without undergoing appropriate processes; and 
there is a clear policy and coherent approach behind all decisions.  
Source: Stern and Holder, 1999, p.45.  
Following stern and holder’s study it is possible to evaluate the performance of regulatory 
organs and define in beyond the legal aspect what good regulatory governance is and what it 
isn’t.In a ‘A Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure RegulatorySystems” published by the 
World bank, Stern et al elaborate a full statement of best practices including: 
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(i) Three regulatory meta-principles; 
Namely credibility because investors sentiment must be that the organ will keep its 
commitment, legitimacy by providing protection of consumers rights, and transparency so 
that both consumers and investors know the rule of the game. 
(ii) Ten key principles; 
 independence;
• Accountability; 
• Transparency and public participation; 
• Predictability; 
• Clarity of roles; 
• Completeness and clarity in rules; 
• Proportionality in application; 
• Requisite powers; 
• Appropriate institutional characteristics; 
• Integrity of conduct. 
(iii) A full list of critical standards for regulation 
As define by the handbook the headings for industry outcome are to be : 
1. Output and consumption; 
2. Efficiency; 
3. Quality of supply; 
4. Financial performance; 
5. Capacity, investment and maintenance; 
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6. Prices; 
7. Competition; 
8. Social indicators.34
For Stern as well as Levy and spiller, the effectiveness of the regulators depends on the 
quality of governance and regulatory decision.35 The governance aspect will have to answer 
question like: is the regulatory agency established by a primary law?Do specified regulatory 
processes exist?How transparent is decision making, etc. 
Effective evaluation as suggested by Stern will consist in: 
 identifying obviously good and bad regulatory decisions – particularlykey 
decisions;
 estimating qualitatively and, where possible, quantitatively the impactof 
key decisions on industry outcomes; 
 review the contribution of regulation to the performance of theregulated 
industry and specific outcomes; 
 provide a critical analysis of regulatory performance 
withRecommendations for improvement; 
 Provide a basis for learning by the regulator, the government,consumer 
groups, companies, investors and others.36
 
34 Sternetal,”A Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory Systems”, World Bank 
3535 JonStern,“Evaluating infrastructure regulators: developing UK and international 
practice.”, CPEA 2006, September, p11. 

36 JonStern,“Evaluating infrastructure regulators: developing UK and international practice.”, 
CPEA 2006, September, p11. 
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In the handbook for evaluating regulators, countries are classified in 4 types following their 
commitment and capacity. And so Countries with strong commitment and strong capacity 
(eg, UK, Germany, Canada, Chile, South Africa) 
2. Countries with weak commitment and strong capacity 
(eg, Argentina, India and Russia) 
3. Countries with strong commitment and weak capacity 
(eg, Brazil, Ghana, Romania, Turkey and Uganda) 
4. Countries with weak commitment and weak capacity37
The focus will be placed on countries in the category three which is the case of majority of 
countries in the sub-Saharan region. The objective will be to identify possible impediments 
and apply suitable solutions following the best practices gathered from the OECD. 
For Stern“econometric and other formal, statistical models can be usedto investigate the 
impact of regulation on specific regulated industryoutcomes.” 
2.2 Empirical background  
In a paper published by the World Bank, Maria Vagliasindi studies the role of 
regulatory governance in driving public private investment in power distribution and 
transmission. A cross- section of 105 developingcountries in a period of 15 years allows her 
to study questions such as the effect of factors like presence of a regulatory agency, standard 
of economy-wide governance, market size and income and integration of renewable energy 
on the likelihood to attract investors in the sector of electricity transmission and distribution 
and also their livelihood. The study reveals that theonlypresence of regulators affects the 
 
37 ibid
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entrance not the volume of investment. No significant link with higher investment is 
determined. Analogically the state of the economy-wide and governance affect the entry only, 
suggesting that private investor once in the market tend to accommodate the governance 
standards. The introduction of renewable enhances investment. However the market size as 
well as the income level is a strong determinant in the level of investment.38
 
i3. DATA DESCRIPTIONS AND METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Sample and source of Data  
With the aim of testing the possibility of a relationship between power sector 
performances and governance, we collected data from 26 Central and West African countries, 
for a period of 15 years (1997 to 2011).We constructed a longitudinal panel set out of the data 
from the above sample of countries. An advantage of panel data is the ability it gives to 
control the eects of missing or unobserved variables given that informationon both over 
time dynamics and individual of the countries are captured in the model.Data are collected 
from mainstream statistical databases such as the World Bank, the Kaufman index of 
governance, the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the World Bank/PPIAF PPI 
Database. The countries selected are all dealing with power crisis. 
3.2 Definition of variables 
The selection of variable is from the macro level with: (1) demographic variables such as 
population, (2) macroeconomic variables such as per capita GDP, (3) economy wide 
 
38 Maria Vagliasindi,“The Role of Regulatory Governance in Driving PPPs in Electricity 
Transmission and Distribution in Developing Countries”, World Bank, July 2012 
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governance variables such as the control of corruption, regulatory quality and democracy (4) 
a dummy variable for nature of ownership, micro level variables based on(5) annual 
investment in electricity with private participation.We made use of publicly available 
information on the nature of ownership and import dependence for the selected countries to 
build dummy variables. Table 3.1 is a description of the above variables. 
Table 3.1 Description of variables  
Variables  Description  
regulatory quality 
wgi_regq 
(ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 
2.5 (strong) governance performance) 
Reflects perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development. 
Control of corruption 
wgi_cc 
(ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 
2.5 (strong) governance performance) 
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state 
by elites and private interests. 
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Degree of democracy  
Polity2 
Revised Combined Polity Score: This 
variable is a modified version of the POLITY 
variable to facilitate the use of the POLITY 
regime measure in time-series analyses. It 
ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 
(strongly autocratic), based on 6 indicators.  
Energy supply per capita in Kwh 
logsupply_pc 
Generation and net import of electricity for a 
single individual. 
Investment  
invest
annual investment in electricity with private 
participation 
GDP per capita  
loggdpc 
Gross domestic product  
Population
Logpop
Population
Ownership dummy 
1 if privately owned or managed 0 if publicly 
owned or managed (management contract) 
The companies nature of ownership either 
privately ownership and/or management or 
SOE 
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Patents Patent applications are worldwide patent applications filed through the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty procedure or with a 
national patent office for exclusive rights for 
an invention--a product or process that 
provides a new way of doing something or 
offers a new technical solution to a problem. 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)
credit_privgdp
Domestic credit to private sector refers to 
financial resources provided to the private 
sector by financial corporations, such as 
through loans, purchases of non-equity 
securities, and trade credits and other 
accounts receivable, that establish a claim for 
repayment. For some countries these claims 
include credit to public enterprises. 
Pump price for gasoline (US$ per liter) 
price_gasoline 
Fuel prices refer to the pump prices of the 
most widely sold grade of gasoline. Prices 
have been converted from the local currency 
to U.S. dollars. 


Captures unobserved, time constant factors 
that affect consumption of electricity such as 
weather conditions 
 Unobserved heterogeneity or time varying 
error
3.3 Methodology
We conduct the present analysis using econometrics instruments. An econometric model 
was built to test the relationship between performance of utility company and country wide 
governance. More specifically, the study attempts to see beyond the relationship, a causal 
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effect of governance on performance of power companies. Limitations can be noticed due to 
difficulties in accessing data for tariffs and climatic inconsistencies that may affect the 
functioning of hydropower plants i.e. 
The panel is define as follow : 
First model 
lsupplypc =_0+_1wgi_ wgi_cc +_2wgi_ polity2 +_3 wgi_ price_gasoline +_4 
invest + _5 wgi_ credit_privgdp + _6 loggdpc + _7 logpop+_8 patents +_9ownership 
+_10 inf_cpi +u_it 
second model 
lsupplypc =ƀ_0+ƀ_1wgi_ wgi_rol +ƀ_2wgi_polity2 +ƀ_3 wgi_ price_gasoline 
+䂱ƀ䂲_4 invest + ƀ_5 wgi_ credit_privgdp + ƀ_6 loggdpc + ƀ_7 logpop+ƀ_8 patents 
+ƀ_9ownership +ƀ_10 inf_cpi +u_it 
Third model 
lsupplypc =ƀ_0+ƀ_1wgi_ wgi_regqu+ƀ_2wgi_polity2 +ƀ_3 wgi_ price_gasoline 
+䂱ƀ䂲_4 invest + ƀ_5 wgi_ credit_privgdp + ƀ_6 loggdpc + ƀ_7 logpop+ƀ_8 patents 
+ƀ_9ownership +ƀ_10 inf_cpi +u_it 
Where; “lsupplypc” designates the logarithm of per capita supply of electricity. We 
intend to reduce or eliminate skew bydefining the above variable in logarithmic terms.A 
white test forheteroscedasticitywas conducted and and allows us to reject the hypothesis that 
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the model suffer from heteroscedasticity bias.Moreover, a test of omitted variables bias 
allowed us to reject the presence of omitted variable bias. 
An interaction term introduced in the model putting together the nature of ownership 
and the level of corruption revealed insignificant and highly problematic when a preliminary 
test of multicollinearity was conducted we therefore excluded the term.  
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
Following panel fixed and random effect regressions, the Hausman test of specification 
suggest random effect results as our optimum estimation. The panel effect was aiming at 
controlling for time invariant variables. The above regression allowed us to obtain robust 
results with an 	
 equal to 0.6657, meaning close to 67 percent of our dependent variable is 
explained by the following model. 
Serial correlation 
Robust result show high degree of statistical significance for our main variables of 
interest. The key result of the paper are the following: 
 Countries with high revenue record an increase in supply 
An outstanding factor can be viewed in GDP per capita as we observe a positive 
statistically significant relationship with per capita power consumption. This to some extend 
joins previous findings by Maria Vagliasindi on the volume of investment in power sector 
being influenced by income. A higher GDP implies investment or production which requires 
intensive energy supply this is explained by the following results. 
 System Improvements due to fight against corruption can be translated into an 
increase in power supply. 
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Confirmation of our hypothesis stands forcontrol of corruption, as an increase in the 
index yields more power supply although the level of significance recorded isn’t ostentatious. 
However a negative significant association is detectable between democracy and per capita 
electricity supply. This suggests that countries with high rank of democracy have registered a 
decrease in supply as data suggests. This remains debatable since most of the countries have 
more or less the same level of democracy.  
 No significance of privately owned companies 
The type of ownership is found to be not significant enough to draw any conclusion on 
their effect on the dependent variable.  
We controlled for elements like the price of alternative source of energy namely 
gasoline, the number of patents as a proxy for the scientific and technological advancement 
of the country and finally access to credit by private entities as a percentage of GDP. All of 
the variables are highly correlated but yield relatively ambiguous relationships. Weviewed 
gasoline as an alternative to hydroelectric electrificationbecause of the fact that oil fueled 
electric generator are still used to produce electricity in countries with poor hydroelectric 
potential. The negative correlation displayed in the results could suggest here that oil is an 
input in itself in the production of electricity; therefore an increase of its price decreases 
powersupply. We tested for different indexes of governance by using them as a substitute for 
to control of corruption in the following model. Given the high correlation between control of 
corruption and others governance quality indexes we found it wise to treat them separately. 
The rationale behind such action is that systematic corruption a resultant of the poor state of 
institutions is to be differentiated from idiosyncratic corruption which exist regardless of the 
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state of institution and can bring about a different impact. Important indexes such as rule of 
law and regulatory quality were picked separately in different models to measure the 
efficiency with which regulatory organs achieve the target of increasing supply to meet the 
ceaselessly increasing demand. 
In both regressions positive highly significant results for both variables are noticeable, 
confirming the previous finding with control of corruption.  
Table 4.1 
Dependent variable: Power supply per Capita  
‘
                Fixed Effect  Radom Effect 
    Robust 
standard errors   
Fixed Effect   Radom Effect 
Control Of  
Corruption 
0.208** 0.201** 0.208*** 0.201*** 
(0.086) (0.082) (0.055) (0.053)
Democracy -0.054*** -0.049*** -0.054*** -0.049*** 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.009) (0.007)
ownership 0.111 0.107 0.111 0.107 
(0.157) (0.146) (0.073) (0.069)
Log GDPC 0.673*** 0.690*** 0.673*** 0.690*** 
(0.088) (0.075) (0.085) (0.075)
Log Population -0.121 -0.102 -0.121** -0.102** 
(0.076) (0.066) (0.049) (0.048)
Investment  0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation (CPI) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Price of 
Gasoline 
-0.847*** -0.820*** -0.847** -0.820*** 
(0.266) (0.185) (0.296) (0.144)
Patents -0.428** -0.409** -0.428*** -0.409*** 
(0.175) (0.166) (0.131) (0.145)
Private credit 
(%GDP)
0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
_cons 3.001* 2.561* 3.001** 2.561** 
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(1.715) (1.363) (1.323) (1.046)
R2 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 
N 125 125 125 125 
With rule of law as our main variable of interest the regression display the following results: 
Table 4.2 
 Dependent variable: Power supply per Capita  
Fixed Effect   Radom Effect 
  Robust 
standard errors   
Fixed Effect   Radom Effect 
Rule Of Law  0.536*** 0.510*** 0.536*** 0.510*** 
(0.138) (0.132) (0.088) (0.086)
Democracy -0.059*** -0.053*** -0.059*** -0.053*** 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.009) (0.007)
Ownership 0.031 0.038 0.031 0.038 
(0.153) (0.142) (0.086) (0.071)
Log GDPC 0.671*** 0.703*** 0.671*** 0.703*** 
(0.082) (0.069) (0.075) (0.065)
Log Population -0.139* -0.107* -0.139** -0.107** 
(0.072) (0.063) (0.054) (0.052)
investment 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation (CPI) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Price of 
Gasoline 
-0.851*** -0.768*** -0.851*** -0.768*** 
(0.252) (0.177) (0.268) (0.130)
Patents -0.428** -0.408*** -0.428*** -0.408*** 
(0.165) (0.157) (0.095) (0.108)
Private credit 
(%GDP)
0.012 0.011 0.012* 0.011* 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
_cons 3.810** 2.986** 3.810** 2.986*** 
(1.666) (1.322) (1.396) (1.115)
R2 0.70  0.70  
N 125 125 125 125 
48

    
   Finally With regulatory quality as our main variable of interest the regression display the 
following results:  
Table 4.3 
Dependent variable: Power supply per Capita  
Fixed Effect  Radom Effect 
   Robust   
standard errors  
Fixed Effect   Radom Effect 
Regulatory
Quality 
0.542*** 0.446*** 0.542*** 0.446*** 
(0.178) (0.163) (0.099) (0.093)
Democracy -0.057*** -0.048*** -0.057*** -0.048*** 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.008) (0.005)
ownership 0.101 0.131 0.101 0.131* 
(0.154) (0.144) (0.084) (0.078)
Log GDPC 0.643*** 0.704*** 0.643*** 0.704*** 
(0.088) (0.073) (0.072) (0.069)
Log Population -0.191** -0.139** -0.191*** -0.139*** 
(0.076) (0.065) (0.056) (0.052)
Investment  0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation (CPI) 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Price of 
Gasoline 
-1.003*** -0.826*** -1.003** -0.826*** 
(0.256) (0.181) (0.331) (0.164)
Patents -0.458*** -0.438*** -0.458*** -0.438*** 
(0.173) (0.167) (0.122) (0.132)
Private credit 
(%GDP)
0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
_cons 4.749*** 3.279** 4.749*** 3.279*** 
(1.808) (1.389) (1.490) (1.177)
R2 0.69  0.69  
N 125 125 125 125 
5. CONCLUSION  
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The interest of this paper is the relationship between the poor performance of power sector 
and the state of governance in west and central African countries. Our basic hypothesis is 
whether the state of institutionsis a strong determinant of the generallylow power production. 
Another aspect of the question was whether the nature of ownership did play a role as 
countries moved from public to private management. The results from this regression allow 
us to make more sense of the phenomenon. 
    Our findings confirmed relatively significant statistical relations between power supply 
per capita and the level of corruption. Stronger relationship where exhibitedwhen applied to 
the income level and price of a substitute. The regression from this model showed no 
statistically significant results related to inflation, investment in the sector or even the nature 
of ownership.  
Obviously limitations are to be taken into consideration such the lack of access 
consistent and more specific data in the following sector. Lack of information on weather 
impact and country specific aspects although captured in the fixed effect could make the 
model more complete. Furthermore availability of time series information on the tariff of 
utility or even a better determinant of performance of power supply such as time series 
information on access to electricity would have also allowed making more bold conclusions.   
A counter intuitive result yield by the relationship with scientific and technical advancement 
state of the countries is also to be taken in consideration. 
However the overall picture shows more similarity to previous studies and theoretical 
hypothesis by Maria Vagliasindi and Devendra Kodwani. The importance of the quality of 
regulatory organs had been established by Levy & Spiller and additionally, studies on further 
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organizational aspects allowedStern & Holderto elaborate a framework from collected best 
practices. It is more consistently important to consider beyond the evaluation of the overseer 
themselves conduct an assessment of the country wide governance state. Transparency and 
accountability could introduce more efficient management of the sector, both in the 
investment climate and the financial management of the utility companies. Lack of 
transparency in the privatization process, Absence of Reinvestment, misalignments of public 
funds, excessive loss in the transmission and distribution phase are many issue a more 
transparent organizational environment could help tackle. 
In conclusion to this study, it can be said that the existence of a possible association 
between macroeconomic performance, country wide governance improvement and the 
performance of utility companies can be drawn. An intensive fight targeting corruption in the 
following countries is necessary to improve by ricochet the state of energy poverty. 
Incentives and demand for monitoring and evaluation in the sector should be increased. Such 
activities in return can help define responsibilities and accountability. This stands as well for 
investment attractiveness which depends highly business climate in the countries. A more 
convincing factor is the economic performance of the countries which can serve drag 
consumption of power energy up as a result of economic well-being. 
Reforming the Power Sector in Africa, M R Bhagavan (ed.) ZED Books Ltd, London  
and New York 
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